Re: draft-ietf-dnsext-forgery-resilience-01.txt

[Shane Kerr <Shane_Kerr@isc.org>]

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Alex,

Alex Bligh wrote:
> 
> The reason I picked this threshold was if you imagine the situation
> where a third party engineers a situation where the resolver concerned
> makes all queries to a server in the control of a third party

I think this rationale makes sense. One thing I often find missing from RFCs is
exactly this sort explanation. Maybe including it would be useful?

- --
Shane
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