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Re: brain cycles of the WG
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> I think I'll be quiet after this post...
This is an important discussion and you have some interesting things to
say.
>
> On Wed, 6 Dec 2006, Edward Lewis wrote:
> > At 16:39 +0200 12/6/06, Pekka Savola wrote:
> >
> >> - load balancers and such dropping all queries except 'A'
> >> - DNS servers giving various sorts of bogus error codes in various
> >> kinds of conditions (e.g., RFC 4074)
> >> - Totally broken (in various ways) DNS resolvers out there (e.g.,
RFC
> >> 3697)
> >
> > (Do you mean 3697? Flow-label? I don't see DNS in there.)
>
> Sorry, 4697.
>
> >> - various pieces of DNS infrastructure not supporting new RR types
as
> >> well as we might like to
> >> - cache poisoning prevention still having no useful normative
> >> specification
> >> - EDNS0 not working very well, e.g., because some products choose
> >> to drop "too big" DNS packets.
> >
> > I don't discount that this happens or is a pain. But with the
exception of
> > the penultimate point, what part of that is the result of the protocol
> > specifications being unclear or missing? E.g., handling only A
> records seems
> > like a choice, not a misbelief that they are the only records in use.
>
> Almost all of these are due to an insufficiently clear specification,
> lack of identification of the "minimum subset of DNS" and to some
> degree insufficient motivation ("why is it important to do this?", see
> e.g. RFC1812 for examples)
DNS certainly has the problem that most people think it is simple to
understand and don't realise there are some real complexities in the
details. This, in my view, explains the astonishing mistakes that many
implementors make.
I think this is going to change as implementors get to grips with DNSSEC.
The complexity of DNSSEC is such that they can't give their DNS work to
the office junior who reads RFC1035 and then thinks that they understand
DNS. Hopefully the trigger of thinking about DNSSEC will force
implementors to address all the bits of DNS they have not yet got around
to understanding.
I'm also increasingly of the view that DNS is /so good/ that most people
simply don't realise it. And it is all those complex and weird little
quirks that enable it to be so good. What worries me about any attempt at
DNSv2 is that some of the brilliance will be lost by trying to 'fix' DNS
and DNS is just too important to work in any less good a way.
Jay Daley
Nominet UK
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