Noah's principle

[Roy Arends <roy@nominet.org.uk>]

I've read MSJ's SO document. I think the approach is certainly 
interesting, but I'm not convinced that Mike's proposal (the part that 
deals with absence of authenticated denial/proven non-existence) will 
significantly increase DNSSEC deployment, which I think is the main 
motivation behind this proposal. I like the idea of the signer being a 
non-parent, (or, for that matter, the signed being a non-child), but that 
is IMHO a whole new research topic.

The discussion on the validity of deploying DNSSEC, or on the feasibility 
or impact of attacks on DNS, is repetitive and old, and has less 
participants every time around. I'm going to apply Noah's principle for my 
own involvement these particular Namedroppers discussions: no more prizes 
on forecasting rain; only for building arks. 

DNSSEC development and deployment is real. A few TLD's deploy DNSSEC, and 
most of the DNS related software developers I've talked to have, or are 
willing to implement DNSSEC. Microsoft's public commitment on adding 
DNSSEC to their server/resolver set is yet one more prize. Meanwhile, 
everyone who wants to use or deploy DNSSEC is screaming for tools, so more 
prizes to win there.

Roy Arends
Nominet

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