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Denial Of Existence: Way Forward
== Denial of Existence and zone enumeration and a way forward.
Now the discussion is less heated and we are nearing a face to face
meeting we want to try to summarize where we are and how to proceed
as a working group.
== Is the problem real?
We have seen long e-mail threads on the reality of the problem of
zone enumeration. The summary of those discussion is that there are
two views on this issue:
1) DNS is a public database, if one has something to hide one should
not put it into the DNS.
2) NSEC walk makes the zone content fully enumerable, policy
forbids us to deploy such mechanism.
There is definitely no consensus on either of these two views being
"the Truth (TM)".
Supporters of '1' have tried to convince supporters of '2' that their
policies are "broken". It is clear that they have not, and will not
succeed. One has to agree on disagreement.
Therefore we are faced with the fact that that major players (a hand
full of large TLDs) will not deploy DNSSEC while NSEC walk is
possible. For them the NSEC walk is a real problem and they have
asked the IETF to engineer a way around the problem. We do not know
if there are more "players" that have enumeration policies that would
prevent them from rolling out DNSSEC.
== Should the DNSEXT WG do this work
This is a problem that needs engineering, it is within scope of the
DNSEXT charter so the short answer is "yes".
The somewhat longer answer is that there are costs associated with
this. It will cost time and money to develop specs, develop the
software and do tests. It is not realistic to think that we can
develop a good solution within a few months. Given our experience
with the rewrite of the DNSSEC specifications a 2 year cycle seems
like a realistic estimate. In that time (members of) the working
group will need to come up with specs and running code.
In order to do the work we will need a "critical mass" of interested
individuals that can commit their resources in writing specs and code
and a superset of individuals that can commit to review.
In order to pursue this work as a working group item we will _not_
ask the question
"Does the group want to see this as a working group item"
but will ask:
1) Who will commit to producing specifications for a denial of existence
method that does not allow for zone enumeration;
We would like to see at least 3 people, which will be assigned an
editors function, to commit.
2) Who will commit on writing an implementation
We would like to see at least 1 individual or group committing to
develop (or fund development) of an implementation.
3) Who will commit on reviewing the material
We would like to see a set of people, different from the set of
editors, to commit to review throughout the development of the
specification.
The intend of this exercise is to see if there is sufficient
critical mass for this work to go forward. Please let us know if you
can commit to 1,2 and/or 3.
== Way forward
There are two (known) ways to approach denial of existence proofs.
a. Dynamically generated NSEC RRs
b. Pre computed "NSEC++" RRs that use some hash scheme to
obscure the namespace
The requirements document that we have is implicitly based on 'b'
type solutions and can be used for further development. We have
heard about 'a' type solutions but have not seen them
documented. These type of solutions, that require on-line keys, may
provide fine interim solutions but unless they are documented in an
I-D we cannot consider them.
Therefore we propose that the working group, iff there is critical
mass, continues by merging the two NSEC++ proposals and produces one
document. This will be a task on the editors team.
However to be able to progress we really need to have to understand
the (conflicting) requirements and set some priority in order to get
to a set of requirements that the group can consent with and on which
editors can base their work..
We feel that the requirement matrix has not yet received sufficient
review and would like this group to look at the requirement document
and the requirement matrix [1]. Please ask questions. (e.g. how come
(11,17) is green?) and make your comments.
If possible people should argue their preference for requirements
that cannot be reconciled (e.g. the opt-in type 11 is preferred over
complete non-existence from 17). With any luck we can compose a list
of "reconcilable requirements".
We hope that this summary provides sufficient ground for a constructive
and cooperative way forward.
Olaf and Olafur
DNSEXT Co-Chairs.
[1] requirement matrix is at:
http://www.links.org/dnssec/requirements-matrix.htm
For fun, amusement and astonishment, slightly related to this topic:
http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/savannah-hackers/2004-10/msg00770.html
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