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Re: DNSKEY flags field



Genuine - meaning that the match of the DNSKEY proto=4 and the DS hash is not the result of a malicious party's insertion of data.

Let's put the question another way. This is a question, I'm seeking ideas.

I begin with a trusted key that I do not question, it's "configured." I use it to verify, in the DNSSEC sense, down the tree to a DS RR (set). I now pick up a DNSKEY RR and find that it matches the DS's RR set. How much to I gain by finding out that the DNSKEY set also matches the signature generated by one of the private keys corresponding to the set? What are the chances it'll fail the signature check?

So, by genuine, I mean, the DNSKEY was used to generate the DS RR's hash for it, and not some other public key that was crafted to match the hash.

(Does this make sense? I barely makes sense to me.)

At 16:03 -0400 6/14/04, Rob Austein wrote:
At Mon, 14 Jun 2004 15:49:52 -0400, Ed Lewis wrote:

Tossing out this - how safe is it to assume that if the hash in a DS RR matches the DNSKEY RR with proto=4, that the DNSKEY RR is genuine? Even if the RRSIG over the DNSKEY set indicates keys that are all proto=4?

Define "genuine". Seriously.


Properly signed DS is an attestation by the parent that it believes
that the child has asked to have this signed key hash listed and that
listing this signed key hash doesn't violate the parent's (unknown,
not part of protocol) policies.  Further deponant sayeth not.

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-- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Edward Lewis +1-703-227-9854 ARIN Research Engineer

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